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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 950736-CA 
v. : 
MICHAEL PATEFIELD, : Priority 2 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions of possession of a 
controlled substance (LSD), a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1995), possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1995) and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, also a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5(l) (1994), in the Seventh 
Judicial District Court in and For San Juan County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court properly determine that what started 
as a routine traffic stop for an equipment violation, and hence a 
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, reverted to a voluntary 
encounter once the arresting officer issued a verbal warning to 
defendant and defendant, rather than simply proceeding on his 
way, decided to replace his burned out license plate light and 
the officer assisted him by illuminating the area with his 
flashlight while defendant attempted to change the bulb? 
The trial court's determination that the seizure reverted to 
a voluntary encounter is most aptly described as a question of 
law that is reviewed for correctness. However, because of its 
highly fact sensitive nature, the trial court's determination 
should be afforded some discretion. See generally State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 935-939 (Utah 1994) (explaining analytical approach 
for determining what standard of review and measure of discretion 
should be afforded trial court determinations of fact sensitive 
legal conclusions). 
2. Did the trial court properly determine that the 
arresting officer had probable cause to believe that there may 
have been open containers of alcohol in defendant's vehicle where 
the officer smelled the odor of alcohol on defendant's breath, 
saw an open u12-pack" of beer from which several containers were 
missing, and both the open 12-pack and a cooler were in the 
passenger compartment within reach of defendant and his 
passenger? 
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This Court reviews "a trial court's determination of whether 
a particular set of facts constitutes probable cause 
nondeferentially for correctness, affording a measure of 
discretion to the trial court." State v, Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 
225 (Utah App. 1995) (citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONS PROVISIONS, STATUTES ANP RTOES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF TOE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance (LSD), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1995), possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1995) and possession of 
drug paraphernalia, also a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5(l) (1994) (R. 1-2). Defendant filed a 
motion to suppress evidence that was seized by police during a 
warrantless search of his vehicle conducted on a public highway 
(R. 11-12). The trial court denied that motion (R. 88-93), and 
defendant entered conditional pleas of guilty under which he 
reserved the right to challenge the denial of his motion to 
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suppress on appeal (R. 20-21, 93-104) . (A copy of the trial 
court's findings, which were made from the bench, is attached 
hereto as addendum A.) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts recited below are drawn from the transcript of the 
hearing on defendant's motion to suppress and are recited in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's findings. State v. 
Anderson, 283 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah 1996); State v, Pelfrnsy, 
869 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994). 
On the night of April 28, 1995, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper 
Rick Eldredge saw an older model Volkswagen van traveling on SR-
191 north of Monticello, Utah. It was dark at the time, and 
Eldredge noticed that the license plate light was burned out. 
The trooper decided to stop the vehicle to issue a verbal warning 
for failure to have the rear license plate illuminated as 
required under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-120(b) (1995) (R. 31-33). 
Upon stopping the vehicle, Eldredge asked the driver for 
identification. The driver produced a driver's license that 
indicated he was Michael Patefield, defendant in the instant 
appeal. Eldredge told defendant that he stopped him because his 
license plate light was burned out, issued a verbal warning for 
failure to have a properly illuminated license plate, and told 
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defendant to uget it fixed" (R. 33, 44) .* 
Defendant explained that he had recently fixed the light and 
asked if he could get out and fix it again. Eldredge agreed that 
he could, and the passenger, William Willey, retrieved a light 
bulb from glove box and handed it to defendant(R. 33, 44). 
Defendant and Eldredge walked to the rear of the vehicle, 
and Eldredge held his flashlight so that defendant could see 
better as he tried to replace the burned out bulb (R. 33, 45). 
Defendant was unable to replace the bulb and decided to get some 
tools out of his van. Eldredge followed defendant as he went 
around the passenger side of the van, opened the sliding door 
just behind the front passenger seat and pulled out a red tool 
box (R. 33-4). Eldredge could see inside the van as he watched 
defendant gather the tools he needed to fix the light. Among 
other things, Eldredge saw a lot of food, backpacks, clothes and 
coolers, which led him to conclude that the two men were going 
camping (R. 34, 49). 
Eldredge also saw several "12-packs" of beer next to the 
sliding door. One of the 12-packs had been opened, and it 
appeared that about half of the containers were gone. Once 
defendant had the tools he needed, and he and Eldredge again 
1
 It was undisputed that Eldredge had by then returned 
Patefield's driver's license and that Eldredge did not run either 
a license or warrants check (R. 55). 
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moved to the rear of the vehicle so that defendant could fix the 
light (R. 33-4) . 
As defendant tried to fix the light, he and Eldredge visited 
about where defendant and Willey had been and where they were 
going (R. 34). Specifically, defendant said that he and Willey 
were on their way to Lake Powell for a camping trip (R. 45). 
During their conversation, Eldredge smelled the odor of 
alcohol on defendant's breath. He let defendant try to fix the 
light, but defendant was again unable to do so. Eldredge 
eventually told him that they could "fix it later" (R. 35). 
Eldredge told defendant he was concerned about the odor of 
alcohol on defendant's breath and the open box of beer in the 
van. He then asked defendant if he had been drinking, and 
defendant said that he had beer for dinner two or three hours 
earlier (R. 35). Eldredge told defendant that he would like 
check inside the van to make sure there were no open containers 
of alcohol in the vehicle (R. 35). 
Defendant went to the front of the van and told Willey that 
"the officer wanted to look for open containers" and asked Willey 
to "please get out" (R. 35). Willey got out of the van and 
brought with him a dog that had been sitting on the back seat at 
the rear of the van. Willey took the dog to the side of the road 
and waited with defendant while Eldredge looked in the van (R. 
35) . 
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The sliding door was still open, and Eldredge leaned across 
the coolers and clothes so that he could look directly behind the 
driver's seat. There was a pile of coats or blankets behind the 
driver's seat, and Eldredge lifted them up to make sure that no 
open containers had been hidden beneath them (R. 35). 
As Eldredge leaned into the van, he could smell the odor of 
burnt marijuana coming from one of two "fanny packs" that were 
laying in the center of the van on top of the food and clothing 
(R. 35). The packs were "right in front of [Eldredge's] face, 
probably six inches from [his] face" (R. 36). Eldredge backed 
up, looked at defendant and said, "I can smell marijuana in one 
or both of th[ose] fanny packs" (R. 36). When Eldredge said he 
did not know exactly which one the smell was coming from, 
defendant, "without saying a word, . . . reached in, grabbed one 
of the fanny packs, zipped it open, [and] handed [Eldredge] a 
marijuana pipe" (R. 36). 
Eldredge looked at the pipe and took the fanny pack away 
from defendant. The trooper opened the fanny pack further and 
saw that it contained several film canisters. Defendant grabbed 
one of the canisters and held it behind his back. Eldredge stuck 
out his hand and instructed defendant to give him the canister. 
Defendant responded, "[n]o. I'll be in a lot of trouble for this 
one" (R. 36). Eldredge told defendant that he was already in 
trouble, and defendant acted like he was going to throw the 
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canister (R. 36) . 
As defendant turned, apparently to ready himself to throw 
the canister, Eldredge grabbed him by the arm and pushed him into 
the van and onto the passenger seat. Eldredge "snatched" the 
canister away from defendant, turned him around and handcuffed 
him (R. 36) . Eldredge opened the canister and saw that it 
contained what he believed to be LSD (R. 37). 
Eldredge took defendant back to his patrol car, apprised him 
of his rights under Miranda. and asked him if he understood his 
rights. Defendant said, My]es," and Eldredge asked him if he 
would speak to him without having an attorney present (R. 37). 
Defendant answered, "[i]t depends on what the question is[,]" and 
Eldredge told defendant that he could "pick and choose" what 
questions he wanted to answer because he (defendant) was 
"basically the boss when it c[ame] to [answering or not answering 
questions]" (R. 37). The only question that Eldredge asked 
defendant was whether there were any more controlled substances 
in the van, and defendant said, " [n]o" (R. 37). 
After having defendant sit in his patrol car, Eldredge 
approached Willey. Eldredge told Willey that defendant was under 
arrest for possession of LSD. Eldredge also specifically told 
Willey that he was not under arrest but indicated that he wanted 
to ask him some questions. While Eldredge did not give Willey a 
Miranda since he had already told him he was not under arrest, 
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Eldredge did tell Willey that he did not have to answer any 
questions. Willey indicated that he understood that he did not 
have to answer Eldredge's questions, and Eldredge asked him if 
there was any marijuana or other controlled substances in the van 
(R. 37-8) . Willey did not say anything, but he "shook his head 
no and shrugged his shoulders as if to say 'no' or 'I don't 
know'" (R. 38). 
Eldredge returned to the van and looked through the other 
fanny pack. It contained some marijuana inside of a film 
canister, some "zig-zag" papers, a knife and some other personal 
items but no identification (R. 38). Because neither defendant 
nor Willey had claimed that fanny pack, Eldredge returned to his 
patrol car and asked defendant if it was his. Defendant said 
u[n]o" and motioned that it belonged to Willey (R. 38). Eldredge 
then asked Willey if he knew who owned the fanny pack, and Willey 
said he did not know who it belonged to (R. 38). 
Eldredge also found a bamboo pipe that appeared to have 
marijuana residue on it in a backpack that was claimed by Willey 
(R. 38-9). Finally, Eldredge found a Tupperware bowl full of 
marijuana underneath a mattress at the rear of the van (R. 39). 
Eldredge told Willey that he was not going to arrest him but 
that he was going to cite him for possession of drug 
paraphernalia. Eldredge then gave defendant the choice of either 
consenting to having Willey drive his vehicle or having it towed 
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by a wrecker. Defendant opted to allow Willey to drive the van, 
and Willey agreed to do so (R. 39, 52). Defendant then told 
Eldredge that he felt very sick and that he may have "soiled his 
pants" (R. 39). 
Eldredge told Willey that he would give him a citation for 
possession of drug paraphernalia at the Public Safety Building 
and took his driver's license. He also explained that Willey 
could then find out exactly how much it would cost to bail 
defendant out of jail and told Willey to follow him to the Public 
Safety Building (R. 39, 40, 52) . 
As Eldredge took defendant to the Public Safety Building, 
Willey followed behind him "very slowly" in defendant's van (R. 
40, 51). Indeed, at some point, Eldredge even lost sight of 
Willey (R. 51). That fact did not concern Eldredge, however, 
because he was not going to arrest Willey since he believed there 
was insufficient evidence to connect him to the drugs found in 
defendant's van (R. 51-2). 
By the time Eldredge and defendant arrived at the Public 
Safety Building, Eldredge was concerned about defendant's 
behavior. Specifically, defendant was in a "cold sweat" and was 
holding his stomach as if he were sick (R. 40). Suspecting that 
defendant might be under the influence of LSD, Eldredge decided 
to call Trooper Sanford Randall, a drug recognition expert who 
knew more about the effects of LSD than did Eldredge. Randall 
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advised Eldredge to conduct some field sobriety tests (R. 40-1) .2 
While waiting for Willey to arrive at the Public Safety 
Building, Eldredge searched through the unclaimed fanny pack in 
which he had already found some marijuana and zig-zag papers (R. 
41, 52) . He found a Steamboat Springs, Colorado dog tag that was 
rolled up in a zig-zag paper (R. 41-3). Eldredge not only knew 
that Willey was from Steamboat Springs, he also knew Willey had a 
dog because the dog was with him in the van (R.' 41, 52) . 
When Willey arrived at the Public Safety Building, Eldredge 
met him in the lobby. Eldredge asked Willey whow long he had 
owned the dog[,]" and Willey replied "around seven years" (R. 42, 
52-3). Eldredge then told Willey that he suspected he owned the 
fanny pack in which there was marijuana because the pack also 
contained a dog tag that belonged to his dog. Willey did not 
respond to Eldredge's comment (R. 42). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly determined that the concededly 
valid stop of defendant's vehicle reverted to a consensual 
encounter. Specifically, after Trooper Eldredge issued a verbal 
warning about the burned out license plate light and told the 
defendant he should "get it fixed," it was clear the traffic stop 
was at an end. Rather than simply proceeding on his way, 
2
 The results of the filed sobriety tests that Eldredge 
administered on Patefield do not appear on the record on appeal. 
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defendant voluntarily elected to see if he could fix the light 
immediately. The fact that Eldredge stayed on the scene and used 
his flashlight to illuminate the area while defendant attempted 
to fix the light does not mean the encounter was a continued 
detention for Fourth Amendment purposes. Rather, as the trial 
court recognized, Eldredge "was just acting as any citizen would" 
by helping defendant replace the faulty light (R. 88). 
Eldredge's detection of the odor of alcohol on defendant's 
breath, the presence of an opened 12-pack of beer with several 
containers missing that -- along with a cooler -- was within 
reach of defendant and his passenger justified the trooper's 
remaining actions. As the trial court recognized, those 
collective facts gave rise to probable cause to believe there 
were open containers of alcohol in defendant's van. Eldredge's 
search of the van for open containers was therefore proper. Once 
Eldredge smelled the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from one 
of two fanny packs, his decision to search those packs and the 
rest of the van for controlled substances was proper. The trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress should therefore 
be upheld and defendant's convictions affirmed. 
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ARCTMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
INVESTIGATIVE STOP OP DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE REVERTED TO A 
VOLUNTARY LEVEL ONE ENCOUNTER 
In keeping with State v. Hiagins, 884 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1994), 
and State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 1992), the trial 
court properly determined that what started as a routine traffic 
stop, and hence a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, reverted 
to a voluntary encounter between defendant and Trooper Eldredge 
once Eldredge issued a verbal warning to defendant for having a 
burned out license plate light and told him to "get it fixed" (R. 
44). At that point, a reasonable person would have felt free to 
leave, and the trial court properly determined that it was 
defendant who voluntarily extended the encounter by deciding he 
wanted to replace the burned out light bulb while Eldredge was 
present (R. 88). The fact that Eldredge assisted defendant by 
illuminating the area with his flashlight in no way demonstrates 
that he "stayed and created the appearance of a continued 
detention and investigation" as defendant argues on appeal. Br. 
of Appellant at 6. Rather, as the trial court found, defendant's 
decision to fix the burned out light immediately was a "voluntary 
act," and Eldredge "was just acting as any citizen would" by 
helping defendant replace the burned out bulb (R. 88). 
In determining the limits of police conduct during a traffic 
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stop, courts employ a two-prong analysis: "whether the officer's 
action was justified at its inception, and whether [the resulting 
detention] was reasonably related [in scope] to the circumstances 
that justified the interference in the first place." Terry v. 
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968). Accord. State 
v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-1132 (Utah 1994). Here, the trial 
court found the initial stop was justified because the license 
plate light of Patefield's van was burned out, a violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-120(b) (1995) (R. 88). Defendant concedes 
that point on appeal. Br. of Appellant at 6. Defendant argues, 
however, that Eldredge exceeded the scope of detention and that 
an "unlawful detention in this case began, most conservatively, 
at the point when the trooper gave a verbal warning and did not 
allow the occupants to proceed on their way." Br. of Appellant 
at 9. Defendant's assertion is based on both a misapprehension 
of the facts as found by the trial court and a misapplication of 
the pertinent law to the facts presented. 
The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that 
Once a person is seized for Fourth Amendment Purposes, 
the seizure does not cease simply because the police 
formulate an uncommunicated intention that the seized 
person may go on his or her way. For the seizure to 
end, it must be clear to the seized person, either from 
the words of the officer or the clear import of the 
circumstances, that the person is at liberty to go 
about his or her business. 
Higgins, 884 P.2d at 1244 (citation omitted). 
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In this case, Eldredge issued a verbal warning to defendant 
about the burned out licence plate light and told defendant "to 
get it fixed" (R. 33, 44). It was undisputed that Eldredge was 
no longer retaining defendant's driver's license or other 
materials at that point, and Eldredge did not even run a license 
or warrants check (R. 55). Defendant could have simply accepted 
the trooper's warning and proceeded on his way. Instead, after 
explaining that he had just recently fixed the burned out light 
and knowing that he had another replacement light bulb in his 
glove compartment, defendant decided on his own accord that he 
wanted to fix the problem immediately. 
At the suppression hearing, defendant conceded that Eldredge 
did not order or command him to fix the light immediately, and 
the trial court found that defendant elected to do so on his own 
volition (R. 61-6). As such, the trial court properly determined 
that the encounter between defendant and Eldredge from that point 
forward was a level one, consensual police-citizen encounter. Cf. 
Castner. 825 P.2d at 705 (noting that the defendant was no longer 
the subject of a Fourth Amendment seizure where the officer had 
returned his driver's license, issued a citation, and the 
defendant voluntarily extended the encounter by questioning the 
officer about where and how to take care of the citation and 
asking the officer why he had asked if there were any weapons in 
his vehicle). 
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Defendant's claim on appeal that Eldredge "stayed and 
created the appearance of a continued detention and investigation 
[by] shadow[ing defendant] as he attempted to fix the licence 
plate light and get tools [from his van]" (Br. of Appellant at 6) 
is an attempt to alter the facts as found by the trial court 
without saddling the burden of showing that court's findings were 
clearly erroneous. It was the trial court's prerogative to make 
findings about the nature and character of the interaction 
between Eldredge and defendant. The thrust of the trial court's 
ruling evidences its determination that the encounter was not 
confrontational or hostile but was instead cooperative and 
friendly in nature. Eldredge merely assisted defendant by 
illuminating the area with his flashlight while defendant 
attempted to replace the burned out bulb during the darkness of 
night on the side of the highway. 
Certainly, Eldredge could also have simply hopped in his 
patrol car and left defendant to his own devices. But, as the 
trial court suggested, that is not what most citizens in 
Eldredge's position would have done (R. 88). Instead, most 
citizens would have stayed and helped defendant, and we should 
expect at least that much if not more from members of our law 
enforcement community. 
In light of the facts as found by the trial court, "the 
words of [Trooper Eldredge and] the clear import of the 
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circumstances" would have made clear to a reasonable person in 
defendant's position that they were "at liberty free to go about 
[their] business." Higgins. 884 P.2d at 1244. The trial court's 
conclusion that the level two traffic stop reverted to a level 
one encounter should therefore be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT ELDREDGE HAD 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH DEPENDANT'S VAN FOR OPEN 
CONTAINERS OF ALCOHOL 
The trial court properly determined that the facts known to 
Eldredge at the time he searched defendant's van provided 
probable cause to believe there were open containers of alcohol 
in the van. This Court reviews "a trial court's determination of 
whether a particular set of facts constitutes probable cause 
nondeferentially for correctness, affording a measure of 
discretion to the trial court." State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 
225 (Utah App. 1995) (citations omitted). Accordingly, this 
Court Moes not conduct a close, de novo review of the trial 
court's probable cause determination; rather, [it] review[s] the 
placement of the legal fences which delimit the pasture of trail 
court discretion to determine what constitutes probable cause." 
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). So 
reviewed, the facts presented to the trial court established 
probable cause. 
Determinations of whether probable cause exists require a 
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common sense assessment of the totality of the circumstances 
confronting the officer at the time of the search. State v. 
Dorsey. 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986). The facts need not 
demonstrate with certainty that incriminating evidence will be 
discovered: 
In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name 
implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not 
technical; they are factual and practical 
considerations of every day life on which reasonable 
and prudent [persons], not legal technicians, act. The 
standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what 
must be proved. 
Pprsey, 731 P.2d at 1088 (quoting Brinegar v, United States/ 338 
U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310 (1949)). Because probable 
cause does not require certainty, u[t]he line between *mere 
suspicion and probable cause . . . necessarily must be drawn by 
an act of judgment formed in the light of the particular 
situation and with account taken of all the circumstances.'" Id. 
(quoting Brinegar. 338 U.S. at 176, 69 S. Ct. at 1311) . 
Courts must also be mindful of the degree of proof required 
to move an officer's belief to the level of probable cause. 
Probable cause means xxa fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found[;]" that "requires only a . . . 
substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of 
such activity." Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238, 243,44 
n.13 (1983). As such, "[t]he quantum of evidence needed for 
probable cause is significantly less than that needed to prove 
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guilt" Spurgeon. 904 P.2d at 226 (citation omitted), and it "does 
not require more that a rationally based conclusion of 
probability[.]" Dorsey. 731 P.2d at 1088. Rather, "probable cause 
is only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of 
criminal activity." Spurgeon. 904 P.2d at 227 (citations 
omitted). 
In this case, Eldredge had more that a mere suspicion that 
defendant's van contained evidence of a crime. As the trial 
court implicitly recognized, the information known to Eldredge at 
the time of the search would have prompted a "prudent, 
reasonable, cautious police officer" to conclude that there was a 
"substantial chance" the van contained open containers of 
alcohol. 
While defendant properly notes that Eldredge based his 
probable cause assessment on the fact that defendant had alcohol 
on his breath and that the van contained an open 12-pack from 
which several containers were missing, defendant is wrong when he 
asserts that "no other factors" supported Eldredge's suspicion of 
open containers. Br. of Appellant at ll.3 Specifically, the 
reasonable inference from the evidence presented was that the 
3
 Defendant's assertion ignores the fact that, while the 
trial court focused primarily on the odor of alcohol and presence 
of 12-packs of beer (one of which was opened), the trial court 
made clear that those two facts had to be considered "in view of 
all the circumstances" (R. 89). 
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open 12-pack of beer and the coolers were within defendant's and 
Willey's reach because they were behind the front seat and by the 
sliding door that opened on the side of the van. That much can 
be inferred from the fact that Eldredge, who searched the van 
through the open sliding door, had to "lean over the coolers'7 as 
he reached across to the other side of the van to lift up the 
blankets and clothes that were "directly behind the driver's 
seat." (R. 34-5) . 
Under the totality of the circumstances, while Eldredge 
candidly acknowledged that he did not suspect defendant was 
impaired, it was reasonable for him to suspect that defendant may 
have recently had a drink of beer and that the open beer 
container was still in the van. It may have been stashed behind 
the driver's seat where Eldredge looked first, or it might have 
been in one of the coolers. 
The fact that Eldredge's suspicion about an open container 
proved wrong does not mean that the trial court's finding of 
probable caiuse was in error. Rather, as the trial court 
implicitly recognized (R. 91), a finding of probable cause is not 
defeated simply because an officer's belief proves wrong: 
Because many situations which confront officers in the 
course of executing their duties are more or less 
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on 
their part. But the mistakes must be those of 
reasonable [persons], acting on facts leading sensibly 
to their conclusions of probability. The rule of 
probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception 
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affording the best compromise that has been found for 
accommodating these often opposing interests. 
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To 
allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at 
the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice. 
ffpurgeon, 904 P.2d at 226 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176, 69 
S. Ct. at 1311). 
Here, the odor of alcohol on defendant's breath, the 
presence of an opened 12-pack of beer with approximately half of 
the containers missing, and coolers in which cold beer might have 
been stored within defendant's and Willey's reach, collectively 
suggest that there was a "substantial chance" that defendant had 
an open container of beer in his van. The trial court's finding 
of probable cause should therefore be affirmed.4 
STATEMENT EESAEPtW? NEEP FOR PRM* ARgtfliENT 
AND DESIRABILITY OF OFFICIAL PUBLICATION 
The facts of this case are straightforward, and the legal 
doctrines at issue are well established. The State therefore 
does not request oral argument or the issuance of an opinion 
designated wFor Official Publication." 
In the event this Court decides to schedule oral argument in 
either this case or in co-defendant Willey's case, State v. 
4
 With respect to defendant's exigent circumstances 
argument, this Court need only recognize that defendant's van was 
stopped on a public highway. Assuming the establishment of 
probable cause, the van was therefore subject to a warrantless 
search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 
State v. Anderson. 283 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 18 (Utah 1996). 
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Willey. No. 950644-CA, then oral argument should be granted in 
both cases. 
CONCISION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, defendant's convictions 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /J^day of March, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
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ADDENDUM A 
Transcript of Trial Court's Oral Findings of Fact and 
Denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
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owned the dog. 
THE COURT: Well, in this case, the officer 
had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, and I find 
that the officer, once he notified the driver of that, that 
the officer then from that point on was just acting as any 
citizen would do in helping them to do what it is they 
wanted to do. This was a voluntary act on Mr. Patefield's 
part in going back to fix it right now. He didn't have to 
do that. And, it should have been clear to him from what 
the officer — from his conversation with the officer that 
he didn't have to do that then. He volunteered to do it. 
And, therefore, this became — this reverted from a citizen 
2 or a level 2 brief investigatory detention to a level 1 
citizen police encounter, which requires no reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause. Something that anybody can do. 
A police officer can walk up to you on the street any time, 
and you, also, have the right to say, "Sorry officer, I 
don't want to talk to you right now." And if he wants to 
make you stand — stop and talk to you, then he has to have 
a reasonable suspicion. 
Even if Mr. Patefield would have understood or did 
understand or reasonably understood from his conversation 
with the officer that he had to stay there, and he had to gcj 
fix it right then, well that — Well, if the officer either! 
intentionally or mistakenly communicated that to them, it 
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was still something that — that was something the officer 
was entitled to do. There was, after all, a violation of 
the law here, which the officer had the right to cite or see} 
corrected on the spot. And, so if Mr. Patefield understood 
it that way and that's why he felt compelled to walk to the 
back of the car, that was something that was perfectly 
permissible as well. It just meant that it remained at a 
level 2 citizen-police encounter with no expanded scope, 
that is, the scope is the license plate light period. So, 
whether it was a level 1 or level 2 stop at the time where 
he smelled the — the officer smelled the alcohol on Mr. 
Patefield's breath, the officer had the right to be there. 
And, he smelled the odor of alcohol on Mr. Patefield's 
breath. He had, also, being where he had every right to be,] 
observed these cartons, these twelve packs of beer, one of 
which had been opened and containers from which were 
missing. And, really the only question I think in this case) 
worth addressing is whether the probable — whether the 
combination of those things taken in view of all the 
circumstances, these twelve packs of beer, one of which had 
clearly been opened and from which containers were missing 
combined with the odor of alcohol on a driver's breath, 
whether those combined make it more likely than not that 
there will be — that this individual has had an open 
container in the vehicle or that there has been someone in 
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M. Jane Mustelman 
GcrUOcd Court Transcriber 
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the vehicle with an open container of alcohol or drinking 
alcohol in the vehicle. So, in a sense the probable cause 
standard has been referred to as a more-likely-than-not 
standard* Sometimes it's referred to as something less: is 
there probable cause to believe that there may be ...? And,! 
in other settings, it seems like what they expect is 
something more than just more likely than not, and it seems 
to be driven in some sense by public policy concerns. For 
example, I ruled a couple of weeks ago that a driver having| 
a smell — odor of alcohol on — a passenger with the odor 
of alcohol on the passenger's breath is not reasonable 
suspicion to inquire concerning open containers or ask for 
consent to search for open containers. And the public 
policy concern there was how else — what are you going to 
do with designated drivers? Are we going to even though 
these people got a designated driver or they called a cab, 
are they still subject to be arrested because they have 
alcohol on their breath? 
I don't see a strong public policy here, and I address 
the question simply as what I think is more likely than not. 
If we stopped a hundred cars on the road which had a driver 
with the odor of alcohol on his breath, an open twelve-pack 
of beer with containers missing from it and you didn't know 
anything more than that, would fifty-one of those be 
situations where there was an open container of alcohol in 
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the vehicle. I think there would be. I think — In this 
case, it turned out that there wasn't. But, I think more 
than fifty-one cases out of a hundred, you would — you 
would find an open container of alcohol with this 
combination of circumstances. For that reason, I find that 
there was probable cause to search this vehicle for open 
containers. And, in the process of that search, the officer} 
looked in one of the most likely places, right behind the 
driver's seat, and in that process smelled the odor of 
marijuana, which then gave, under the (inaudible) probable 
cause, to search for marijuana. He was able to search for 
marijuana, and once he found that, other drugs. 
The question of Mr. Wiley's statement in response to a 
question, I find that that was interrogation because the 
officer by this time had seen the dog tag. That's right 
isn't it? By this time he had seen the dog tag, so he was 
asking that question not just out of ideal curiosity, but —I 
not to pass the time of day, but to connect Mr. Wiley to the) 
dog tag, which tied him to the fanny pack in which the 
marijuana was located. The other prong of the analysis 
there is whether Mr. Wiley was in custody. And I don't 
believe Mr. Wiley was in custody. From all the facts and 
circumstances of this case, I believe Mr. Wiley was acting 
to help Mr. Patefield out — helping Mr. Patefield avoid 
impoundment of his vehicle and was simply driving up to the 
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police station to receive his citation for the possession of] 
paraphernalia and to find out what was going to be happening 
with Mr. Patefield so that he could decide whether he wanteq 
to go on to his eventual designation or wait for him here. 
And, therefore, I find Mr. Wiley was not in custody. He was] 
not — he was at the Public Safety Building, but he was not 
in an interrogation room. He was not hand cuffed. He had 
driven there freely, that is choosing — driving himself. 
Now, he had not be able to, once he accepted the assignment 
he wasn't free to drive off. He needed to come there in 
order to receive his citation. But, the — it was not an 
accusatory question. It was simply, I mean, it wasn't like 
he was being subjected to the third degree, "tel me the 
truth or else." So, I find he was not in custody, and 
therefore, there was no Miranda Warning required. He is not] 
— I will not suppress that statement. 
I think that addresses all of the issues. Mr. Halls, 
you may wish to make Findings and Conclusions. I tired to 
cover this in sufficient detail for appellant review. 
MS REILLY: Your Honor, with respect to that, 
I think that one thing I would like to see in the Findings 
of Fact is the fact the officer testified that he took Mr. 
Wiley's driver's license from him when he left and had Mr. 
Wiley follow him back. 
THE COURT: Okay. I take it he took that so 
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he could use it to write out the citation. But, it did mean| 
that Mr. Wiley was going to need to come to the Public 
Safety Building in order to get his citation and his license} 
back. 
MS REILLY: Your Honor, with respect to this 
matter and in light of the court's ruling, we wish to enter 
conditional pleas of guilty at this time and ask the court 
accept the conditional pleas, because we intend to notice ofl 
appeal on this matter. And, also, I would ask in advance iq 
the court would stay the sentence pending appeal. I 
understand that Mr. Wiley has a bail. I'm advised — a bail] 
that's already set up. 
THE COURT: Are you agreeing to a conditional 
plea here, Mr. Halls? 
MR. HALLS: Well, I was just trying to run 
through it in my mind. If we go through a trial in the 
matter and spend a couple of days, then they can still 
appeal it on the same issue. So, I'm not sure I gain 
anything by not agreeing to conditional — conditional 
pleas. If they're going to plead to the — to this as 
charged, they can appeal it back to the trial anyway, so I 
guess I really don't have any objection to it. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS REILLY: Do you wish us to come forward, 
Your Honor? 
